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THE (COMIC) TRAGEDY OF FORMALISM
IN SHAKESPEARE’S THE MERCHANT OF VENICE
JOSH NISKER†
ABSTRACT
William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice addresses various 
legal issues and themes, with perhaps none being so pronounced as 
the struggle between formal positivism and natural law. Ostensibly, 
The Merchant of Venice dramatizes the dangers of rigid adherence to 
formalism and the triumph of natural law through Portia’s legal defeat 
of Shylock. On a more profound level, Shakespeare’s portrayal of the 
Venetian trial scene raises grave concerns about the essential nature 
and manner of that defeat.  While Portia is originally positioned as a 
sympathetic proponent of natural law, she is soon revealed as one of its 
grossest violators. Thus, the play ultimately functions as a cautionary 
exposé on the hypocrisy of power, the abuse of fair process, and the grim 
reality that the law may be exploited to malicious and unnatural ends.
 This paper begins by addressing the philosophical foundations 
of   natural   law,   and   the   profound   influence   that   natural   law   bore   on  
English Renaissance writers. This is necessary to frame the next section 
of the paper, which explores the tension between natural law and positive 
law in The Merchant of Venice. Here it is argued that Shakespeare’s 
portrayal of natural law in the Act IV trial scene operates as a dramatic 
reflection  of  the  English  legal  system  and  its  inherent  failings.  The  paper  
also contends that The Merchant of Venice dramatizes the emerging 
conflict  between  equity  and  common  law  in  Shakespeare’s  England.  The  
final  section  highlights  various  abuses  of  natural  justice  within  the  play  
as further violations of natural law.  
Ultimately,  The  Merchant  of  Venice  calls  upon  the  audience  to  “judge  
the  judge.”  By  exposing  grave  deficiencies  in  the  English  legal  system  
(as  expressed  through  the  fictional  Venetian  system),  the  play  obliges  the  
† Josh Nisker is a third year law student at the University of Western Ontario, and will 
be articling at Goodmans LLP in Toronto. The author would like to thank Professor 
Mysty Clapton for her help and support in preparing this paper.
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audience  to  make  a  critical  moral  judgment  on  the  proper  administration  
of  justice.  As  this  paper  submits,  the  audience  must  reach  a  moral  and  
rational conclusion in accordance with natural law. 
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INTRODUCTION
F. Lyman Windolph wrote that, “The Merchant of Venice is one of 
Shakespeare’s most charming comedies—so charming, indeed, that we 
are inclined to forget that it is altogether without morals.”1 Shakespeare’s 
famous play addresses various legal issues and themes, with perhaps 
none being so pronounced as the struggle between formal positivism 
and Natural Law. Ostensibly, The Merchant of Venice2 dramatizes the 
dangers of rigid adherence to formalism and the triumph of Natural Law 
through Portia’s legal defeat of Shylock. On a more profound level, 
Shakespeare’s portrayal of the Venetian trial scene raises grave concerns 
about the essential nature and manner of that defeat. While Portia is 
originally positioned as a sympathetic proponent of Natural Law, she is 
soon revealed as one of its grossest violators. Thus, the play ultimately 
functions as a cautionary exposé on the hypocrisy of power, the abuse 
of fair process, and the grim reality that the law may be exploited to 
malicious and unnatural ends.
I. NATURAL LAW IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND
In order to bring the relevant issues to bear, it is necessary to address 
the philosophical foundations of Natural Law. Once established, these 
principles  will  be  explored  in  light  of  their  dramatic  significance  in  The 
Merchant of Venice. 
Richard  Devlin  identifies  three  central  themes  to  Natural  Law,  or  lex  
naturalis. First, Natural Law claims to be “universal, immutable, eter-
nal, objective, and beyond any particularized political or historical con-
text.” Second, the validity of a law depends on its content, and not just 
its form. Third, Natural Law is “superior to human law and therefore has 
the  justificatory  and  censorial  power  to  determine  whether  enacted  (i.e.  
positive) laws are morally binding.”3 These themes will be explored by 
1  F. Lyman Windolph, Reflections  of  the  Law  in  Literature  (New  York:  Books  for  
Libraries Press, 1956) at 46 [Windolph].
2  William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice,  ed.  by  David  Bevington,  (New  
York:  Bantam  Books,  1988).  
3   Richard  F.  Devlin,  “Mapping  Legal  Theory”  (1994)  32  Alta.  L.  Rev.  602  at  604-­
605.
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way of a brief historical and philosophical account of Natural Law and 
its principles. 
The concept of Natural Law originated with the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers, was adopted by Plato, and was positively received 
by other classical theorists such as Aristotle and Cicero.4  This  first  
development of Natural Law was premised as a principle of order, 
based on reason, which was said to regulate the universe.5 It was 
regarded as universal law because it ordained that certain rules 
of conduct are “so just that they are binding on all of mankind.”6 
Natural Law could thus be contrasted with human laws, which 
are apt to frequent variation and arbitrariness in substance and 
procedure. Whereas human laws vary with political, cultural, and 
historical contexts, Natural Law was said to be discovered by the 
light of human reason and knowable to all people at all times.7 Thus, 
according to the classical philosophers, a man acted in conformity 
with the Law of Nature when he lived in accordance with the dictates 
of his reason, irrespectively of any Positive Law to the contrary.8 
The universal character of Natural Law is particularly evident in the 
concept of natural justice, the precepts of which exist independently 
of statutory declaration.9 
The classical model of natural law was revived by medieval and 
Renaissance Christian theorists, reaching a high watermark with St. 
Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas stated that if a 
human law is at variance in any particular with natural law, it is no 
longer legal, but rather “a perversion of law.”10 While classical and 
early medieval Natural Law theorists conceived Natural Law on a 
4  R.S. White, Natural  Law  in  English  Renaissance  Literature  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 4.
5  George W. Keeton, Shakespeare’s  Legal  and  Political  Background  (London:  Sir  
Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1967 at 67-68.  
6  White, supra note 4 at 1. 
7  White, supra note 4 at 1.  
8  Keeton, supra note 5 at 68.
9  The two limbs of natural justice are audi alteram pertem (the  right  to  be  heard)  
and nemo  judex  in  parte  sua  (no  person  may  judge  his  or  her  own  cause).  The  second  
tenet of natural justice, nemo  judex,  has  particular  significance  to  The Merchant of 
Venice and will be discussed in this paper.
10    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia (New  York:  Benziger  Bros.,  1947)  at  
95,  2  (in  Treatise  on  Law,  First  Part  of  the  Second  Part).  Aquinas  built  upon  St.  
Augustine’s theory that there is no law unless it is just. 
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rational foundation alone—that of a universal law discovered through 
human reason—medieval and Renaissance Christian philosophers 
added the notion of conscience to the Natural Law equation and 
theorized that there existed an integral relationship between law 
and morality.11 Additionally, they insisted that both reason and 
conscience are G-d-given12 faculties.13 Thus, with Aquinas, the law 
of nature became a thoroughly moral principle which generated and 
authorized all human laws. It came to be regarded by Renaissance 
theorists as “essential justice, the origin and test of all positive laws, 
and the ultimate measure of right and wrong.”14 
Aquinas  identified  four  types  of  law  in  his  famous  work  Summa Theo-
logica:  Eternal,  Natural,  Human,  and  Divine.  The  first  three  are  of  par-
ticular  significance  to  this  paper.15 Eternal law, the Law of G-d, exists 
in the mind of G-d and controls the universe. However, as Aquinas in-
dicated, not all of G-d’s Law is discoverable to humans.16 Aquinas thus 
described Natural Law as “the participation of the eternal law in the 
rational creature,” referring to the extent to which eternal Law may be 
discovered by right reason.17 The primary tenet of Natural Law is that 
“good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided,” and from this 
all  other  Natural  Law  principles  flow.18 These include the preservation 
of life and equality among individuals.19 Human Law is devised from 
the “operation of human reason, and is the product of the application of 
the precepts of natural law to human circumstances.”20 While Natural 
11  Devlin, supra note  3  at  604.
12  As a note to the reader, Judaism prohibits an individual to write out the full name 
of the Divine—as such, “G-d” will be used as a substitute.
13  White, supra note 4 at 2-3. White states that this advancement in natural law was 
prompted, in part, by a fear that a reliance on the universal faculty of reason would 
eliminate the need for G-d.  
14  A.P. d’Entrèves, Natural  Law:  An  Historical  Survey  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  
1951)  at  7  (emphasis  added).
15  Divine Law, or the will of G-d revealed through the Old and New Testaments, is 
not relevant to this discussion.
16  Keeton, supra note 5 at 72.
17  Aquinas, supra note  10  at  91,2.
18  Aquinas, supra note  10  at  94,  2.
19  White, supra note 4 at 4. 
20    Keeton, supra note 5 at 72.
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Law exists independently of Positive Law, any discordance between the 
Law of Nature and the Law of Humans must render that Positive Law 
void. Natural Law is thus regarded as the basis, authority, and standard 
for all human laws.
Aquinas’ theory of Natural Law permeated Renaissance thought 
and found great favour among theorists such as Suárez and Grotius. 
While Renaissance legal theorists accepted the existence of two spheres 
of justice—G-d’s Law and Human Law—the concept was nevertheless 
invoked to justify social hierarchies that violated the natural notion of 
equality, such as the divine right of kingship and racial subjugation. Still, 
this  concept  dominated  Renaissance  thought  and  profoundly  influenced  
the writers of the period. As White states, the Renaissance imaginative 
writer thought of literature, in a sense, as performing the “function of 
G-­d.”  The  writer  was  figured  as:  
[A] controlling deity of a constructed world of human beings who 
make, obey, and break their own laws within that world, and must 
stand   judged   and   often   condemned   by   themselves,   their   fictional  
peers, readers, and audiences in the universal court of Natural 
Law.21 
The thematization of morality in Renaissance literature thus requires 
characters and readers to make moral judgments against the Natural Law 
milieu, and this literary usage is particularly evident in Shakespeare’s 
The Merchant of Venice. 
The trial scene in The Merchant of Venice dramatizes   the  conflict  
between Positive Law and Natural Law, as the Venetian legal system 
betrays the Natural Law tenets of respect for human life, equality 
among humans, and an individual’s right to a fair process. Although 
the  characters  escape  condemnation  from  their  fictional  peers  in  the  
face of gross violations of Natural Law, the play requires the audience 
to critically evaluate the procedural and substantive qualities of the 
Venetian  law  (as  an  expression  of  English  law)22 in order to reach 
a moral and rational conclusion in accordance with Natural Law. 
Ultimately, the play obliges the audience to judge the judge.
21  White, supra note 4 at 8.
22  Which will be discussed below.
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II. NATURAL VERSUS POSITIVE LAW IN  
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE
The plot of The Merchant of Venice is driven by a bond between Shylock, 
a Jewish usurer, and Antonio, the title merchant of the play. Antonio 
agrees  to  give  his  bond  in  guaranty  of  a  loan  for  his  good  friend  Bassanio,  
a  spendthrift  who  wishes  to  woo  Portia,  the  rich  heiress  of  Belmont.  A  
“penalty clause” is attached to the bond, and Antonio pledges a pound of 
his  flesh  if  the  sum  is  not  repaid  to  Shylock  within  three  months.    When  
Antonio’s overseas mercantile ventures fail and render him in default of 
his payment, Shylock seeks satisfaction of the penalty before a court of 
law. This scene, which will be addressed in depth below, is the climax of 
the play and the centre of much literary and legal scrutiny. 
While The Merchant of Venice is set outside of England, it is sig-
nificant  to  note  that  Shakespeare  often  displaced  the  action  of  his  plays  
in order to tackle contemporary English issues and avoid political back-
lash. For example, although much of the play takes place in Venice,23 
the Venetian court applies English law “and the trial of the action on the 
bond is approached in strictly Common Law terms.”24 Furthermore, the 
penalties attached to common money bonds in Shakespeare’s England 
were fully enforceable by law.25 While penalty clauses were enforce-
able by the common law of contract, they could still be defeated by the 
courts of Chancery.26 The chancellors of equity declared that such iniq-
uitous contracts were void as contrary to Natural Law, and as Windolph 
notes,  they  granted  injunctions:  
[R]estraining moneylenders, even after legal judgments had been 
entered in their favor, from collecting more than the actual amount 
of the loans together with interest at the lawful rate.27 
23  There are two primary locations in The Merchant of Venice: Venice, which is 
the  satiric  centre  of  mercantilism,  and  Portia’s  Belmont,  the  centre  of  the  romantic  
subplot. 
24  Keeton, supra  note  5  at  140
25  Keeton, supra note 5 at 136. 
26  White, supra note 4 at 159. Described by White as “England’s court of Natural 
Law.”
27  Windolph, supra note 1 at 55.
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In   fact,   Shakespeare’s   England  was  marked   by   an   emerging   conflict  
between the courts of common law and equity, between Chief Justice 
Edward Coke and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere.28 Several theorists assert 
that  this  struggle  had  a  profound  influence  on  Shakespeare’s  trial  in  The 
Merchant of Venice.29      
The Act IV trial scene in The Merchant of Venice may be viewed 
as  pitting  Natural  Law  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  equity  against  formal  
positive law.30 Lyon calls the trial scene “one of the most astonishing 
moments in our dramatic history.”31 However, as Ziolkowski states, 
“the fourth act comes closer to a travesty than to a representation of 
a trial.”32  As  will  be  demonstrated,  the  conflict  of  laws  in  the  play  
is not clear-cut, nor easily resolved, and the trial raises a host of 
substantive and procedural considerations.
28  Windolph, supra note 1 at 53-54. A professional rivalry between these two 
individuals emerged into a personal hatred. Ellesmere, the Lord Chancellor, would 
allow losing litigants to recommence their proceedings in Chancery and often issued 
injunctions against victorious common law litigants, preventing them from enforcing 
the court’s judgment. Lord Chief Justice Coke’s common law courts countered by 
holding people in contempt if they refused to comply with the court’s judgment. 
29  Windolph, Andrews, and Kornstein all submit that Shakespeare dramatizes, on 
one  level  or  another,  this  equity/common  law  conflict.  White,  on  the  other  hand,  
states that Shakespeare’s courtroom makes no references to equitable or common 
law procedure. White accepts the equity argument to a point, but only to the extent 
that the trial represents the larger struggle between Natural and Positive Law. 
Justice Posner likewise submits in Law  and  Literature:  A  Misunderstood  Relation 
(Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1988)  at  97  that  “[n]o  equitable  principles  
actually inform the law of Venice as it is presented in the play.” While Justice Posner 
makes some astute observations, I believe his argument is subverted by the fact 
that the Venetian court upholds the English common law of contract, and that an 
equitable remedy is awarded to Antonio at the conclusion of the trial. 
30     While  White  and  Posner  submit  that  equity  does  not  figure  very  prominently  in  
The Merchant of Venice per se, I only accept this argument, if at all, to the extent that 
equity  is  dramatized  within  the  larger  Natural  Law  rubric  (as  White  does).  However,  
as  will  be  addressed  below,  equity  figures  palpably  in  terms  of  the  remedy  awarded  
to Antonio, and arguably as an agent of Natural Law in trumping Shylock’s common 
law bond.
31  John Lyon, Twayne’s New Critical Introductions to Shakespeare: The Merchant of 
Venice  (Boston:  Twayne  Publishers,  1988)  at  98.  
32  Theodore Ziolkowski, The  Mirror  of  Justice:  Literary  Reflections  of  Legal  Crises 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press)  at  175.
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The trial commences in what is described as “a court of justice” before 
the Venetian Duke. Shylock, contemptuously referred to by the court as 
“Jew,” seeks “the due and forfeit of [his] bond” from Antonio.33 While 
the court implores Shylock to give “a gentle answer,” Shylock enter-
tains  nothing  of   the  sort,   in  spite  of   the  fact   that  Bassanio  offers  him  
twice   (and   later   three   times)   the   amount   owed.34 Shylock, driven by 
revenge and a bitter hatred towards Antonio,35 demands the pound of 
flesh  that  he  is  rightly  owed  under  Venetian  law.  He  steadfastly  clings  to  
the law—he “crave[s] the law”36—and represents a depraved adherence 
to  positivism:
The  pound  of  flesh  I  demand  of  him
Is dearly bought, is mine, and I will have it. 
If  you  deny  me,  fie  upon  your  law!
There is no force in the decrees of Venice.
I stand for judgment.37 
Throughout the scene, Shylock demands nothing but the law, and re-
peatedly “stands for judgment.” The law is clearly on Shylock’s side, 
and there is no dispute as to the enforceability of the bond.38 However, 
33  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 37.
34  Shakespeare, supra note  2  at  IV.  i  ln.  34.  Bassanio  is  able  to  repay  the  debt,  albeit  
late, due to his newfound relationship with Portia.
35  Shylock’s reasons for hating Antonio may be viewed as threefold. First, Antonio 
lends  money  interest-­free  which  costs  Shylock  significant  business.  Second,  he  
abuses Shylock because he is a Jew, spurning, kicking, and spitting at him when he 
passes  him  in  the  street  (Antonio  is  hardly  a  sympathetic  character  in  this  regard).  
Third, Shylock despises Christians for their mistreatment of him, their “stealing” 
of  his  daughter  Jessica  (who  absconded  with  her  love  Lorenzo  and  converted  to  
Christianity), and the theft of his jewels by those same two individuals. In addition 
to his obsession with positivism, which will be explored immediately, Shylock’s 
seeking of revenge further polarizes the Jew from principles of Natural Law by 
offending Christian morality and forgiveness. However, as I will also demonstrate, 
the Christians prove no better in this respect.
36  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at  IV.i  ln.  204.
37  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at  IV.i  ln.  99-­103.
38  Antonio acknowledges the state of Venetian contract law, the commercial 
necessity of enforcing bonds in a mercantile state, and the inability to change the law 
as  prescribed.  In  Act  III,  Scene  iv  he  states  (at  ln.  26-­31):  
The Duke cannot deny the course of law;
For the commodity that strangers have
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as  it  is  certain  that  the  cutting  of  the  pound  of  flesh  will  cause  Antonio’s  
death, the English legal practice of enforcing penalty clauses stands in 
stark opposition to Natural Law and the preservation of life. Thus, it is 
not only Shylock, but positive law itself that threatens Antonio’s life and 
freedom.39
Portia  enters  the  court  disguised  as  Balthazar,  a  doctor  of  laws,  on  
behalf  of   the   famous   lawyer  Bellario.  When  Bellario   is  unable   to   at-
tend  court,  Balthazar  is  sent  in  his  stead  to  lend  “his”  legal  expertise.40 
Whereas Shylock demands the law, his bond, and judgment, Portia 
speaks in favour of justice. In her famous speech, beginning “the qual-
ity of mercy is not strained,” she extols the virtues of mercy as “an 
attribute to G-d himself,”41 and aligns herself with the Christian Ren-
aissance conception of Natural Law.42 Andrews contends that, read in 
light of sixteenth-century English jurisprudence, it becomes evident that 
Portia’s speech offers far more than “a sermon on the virtues of mercy.” 
Rather, Shakespeare 
[W]as holding up a mirror for all to see the dramatic climax of an 
age-­old  conflict  between  the  common  law  courts  which  dispensed  
unmitigated ‘justice’ by the strict letter of the law, and the courts of 
chancery where ‘mercy seasons justice’ to do equity.43 
Portia, seeking to season justice with mercy, beseeches Shylock to “be 
merciful. / [T]ake thrice thy money; bid me tear the bond.”44 She be-
comes an advocate of Natural Law in appealing to Shylock’s morality, 
and by attempting to spare Antonio’s life from the strict legal appli-
With us in Venice, if it be denied,
Will much impeach the justice of the state,
Since  that  the  trade  and  profit  of  the  city
Consisteth of all nations. 
39  White, supra note 4 at 164.
40    As will be discussed below, the nature of Portia’s role is highly suspect.
41  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 193.
42  Once again, the Renaissance theorists aligned natural law with reason and 
conscience, which they regarded as G-d-given faculties. 
43  Mark Edwin Andrews, Law  versus  Equity  in  The  Merchant  of  Venice  (Boulder:  
University of Colorado Press, 1965) at xi.
44  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 231-32.
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cation of the penalty.  Despite her passionate pleas, however, Shylock 
adamantly requests satisfaction of his bond.45  
Unable   to   appeal   to   Shylock’s   humanity   (or   lack   thereof),   Portia  
succumbs  to  his  exacting  demands—she  states:
[T]here is no power in Venice 
Can alter a decree established […]. 
A  pound  of  that  same  merchant’s  flesh  is  thine.  
The court awards it, and the law doth give it.46 
Despite this concession, Portia cunningly proves that it is indeed pos-
sible to “deny the course of law.”47 As Shylock prepares to cut the pound 
of  flesh  nearest  Antonio’s  heart,  Portia  interjects  and  states:  
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; 
The  words  expressly  are  ‘a  pound  of  flesh.’48 
Portia points out that if Shylock sheds “[o]ne drop of Christian blood”49 
in   his   cutting   of  Antonio’s   flesh,   he   will   himself   breach   the   express  
wording  of  the  contract  which  stipulates  a  pound  of  flesh,  no  more  and  
no less. Accordingly, Shylock will stand in violation of Venetian law 
under penalty of death and forfeiture of his estate. Shylock, who has de-
manded “the law” throughout the entire hearing, can only say in bewil-
derment:  “Is  that  the  law?”50 Realizing he cannot exact his bond without 
standing in breach of it, Shylock remits and asks for his principal in 
defeat.  Thus, Portia ousts Shylock’s bond by employing a more literal 
reading than Shylock himself propounded. She craftily uses formalism 
to defeat itself, and her hyper-technical interpretation not only reveals 
the  ludicrousness  of  the  English  law  of  contract  (as  expressed  through  
the  fictional  Venetian  law),  but  renders  a  just  result  in  accordance  with  
45   Shakespeare,  supra  note  2  at  IV.i  ln.  256-­57  and  260.  Shylock  is  so  formalistic  in  
his devotion to “the law” that when Portia suggests a surgeon be brought to tend to 
Antonio’s  wounds  “lest  he  do  bleed  to  death,”  Shylock  responds:  “Is  it  so  nominated  
in  the  bond?  …  I  cannot  find  it;;  ’tis  not  in  the  bond.”  
46  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i at ln. 216-17 and 297-98.
47  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at III.iv ln. 26.
48  Shakespeare, supra note  2  at  IV.i  ln.  305-­06.
49  Shakespeare, supra note  2  at  IV.i  at  ln.  309.
50    Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i at ln. 313.
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principles of Natural Law. As stated, the legal practice of enforcing 
penalty clauses not only threatens Antonio’s life, but affronts human 
conscience  and  morality  by  allowing  Shylock  to  exact  revenge  (and  in  
such a reprehensible manner). This law is irreconcilable with the Natu-
ral Law principle that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be 
avoided,” and as such, Natural Law properly renders that positive law 
void in The Merchant of Venice.  
Having defeated Shylock’s bond and preserved the order of Natu-
ral Law, Portia may rightly be viewed as one of Shakespeare’s greatest 
heroines. This acclaim should be short-lived, however, as she proceeds 
to  tear  down  the  very  institution  she  sanctified  in  her  sermon  on  mercy.  
In doing so, Portia reveals her true colours as a malevolent hypocrite 
and abuser of the law.51 As Shylock prepares to leave court, denied his 
principal  and  burdened  with  Antonio’s  forfeiture,  Portia  exclaims:  “Tar-
ry,  Jew!  /  The  law  hath  yet  another  hold  on  you,”52 and she proceeds to 
state  that:
It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
If it be proved against an alien
That by direct or indirect attempts
He seek the life of any citizen,
The party ’gainst the which he doth contrive
Shall seize on half of his goods; the other half
Comes to the privy coffer of the state,
And the offender’s life lies in the mercy 
Of the Duke only.53
While Portia justly defeats Shylock’s bond which secures its authority 
in a base, “unnatural” law of contract, she then relies on an equally cor-
rupt Alien Statute to punish him in the face of Natural Law.54 Under the 
Alien Statute, non-Christians were not regarded as citizens of Venice. 
As aliens, they were thus subject to harsher penalties than citizens for 
51   Yet  this  criticism  may  be  slightly  tempered  by  the  fact  that  Portia,  like  Shylock,  
merely enforces the law as it stood.
52  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 344-45.
53  Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 346-54.
54  Although this violation may have not been readily apparent to Shakespeare’s 
fictionalized  characters,  nor  to  his  audience,  as  the  persecution  of  minorities  was  
likely  justified  as  “natural.”      
FORMALISM IN THE MERCHANT OF VENICE . . . 269 
the  commission  of  equal  crimes.  By  failing  to  treat  persons  as  equals,  
this statue represents a gross violation of Natural Law; and the law not 
only brings Portia’s character into question,55 but also that of the country 
which  upholds  it.  Keeton  identifies  this  statute  as  holding  a  particular  
significance,  as  “[t]here  was  also  a  similar  law  in  England,  [which]  the  
audience very well knew.”56 As such, the presence of this statute reveals 
the  hypocrisy  inherent  in  the  legal  systems  of  fictional  Venice  and  Shake-
speare’s England, as Natural Law is welcomed by equity in one hand 
(the  trouncing  of  penalty  clauses  in  bonds),  yet  blindly  shunned  by  the  
other  (the  persecution  of  minorities).57 Although one of the maxims of 
the court of Chancery is that “he who seeks equity must do equity,” the 
state allows individuals to soil this principle with their unclean hands. 
In  the  end,  Portia  merely  applies  Venetian  (or  English)  law  as  Shy-
lock did, and should not be regarded as the lesser for doing so. What 
ultimately makes Portia more reprehensible, however, is her brazen hy-
pocrisy in abandoning the natural morality and compassion which she 
so ardently advocated. She is not only a violator of Natural Law, but a 
traitor to it. Whereas Portia preached mercy to Shylock earlier in the 
scene, she hypocritically reverses the appeal when the balance of power 
shifts in Antonio’s favour. As Kornstein states, Portia does not “season 
justice with mercy.” Instead,
[H]er inconsistency between word and deed is vast. The gulf between 
her preaching about mercy […] and her vengeful punishment of 
Shylock is unbridgeably wide […]. [S]he practically begs Shylock 
to be merciful, and […] she acts with extraordinary cruelty to him 
only moments later.58 
55  Who has, on several instances, revealed herself to be of questionable character. 
Kornstein even goes to the extreme of calling her “a world-class equal opportunity 
hate-­monger.”  Daniel  J.  Kornstein,  “Fie  Upon  Your  Law!”  (1993)  5  Cardozo  Stud.  L.  
& Lit. 35 at 45. 
56  Keeton, supra note 5 at 145. 
57  Supra note 29 at 97. In fact, Shylock’s marginalized status as a Jewish “alien” 
may provide a reasonable explanation as to his strict interpretation of the Venetian 
law. As Justice Posner states, “for such a victim of discrimination, it is entirely 
logical and reasonable to trust in the apparent severity of a rigid but certain 
interpretation of law rather than in the discretion of a system that has already shown 
its  bias…  But  he  who  lives  by  the  letter  of  the  law  may  perish  by  it,  too.”  
58  Kornstein, supra note 55 at 45.
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While Portia could have yielded the instant she defeated Shylock’s 
bond, she goes on to punish him. Portia thus stands in violation of Natu-
ral  Law  on  several  accounts:  through  her  strict  use  of  the  anti-­Semitic  
Alien  Statute  (which  opposes  Natural  Law  in  its  substantive  content),  
and in her merciless exacting of revenge against the Jew.59  
Having invoked the Alien Statute, Portia uses the law to appropriate 
Shylock’s estate and subject his life to the mercy of the Duke. She orders 
Shylock to the ground, like a dog, to beg for the Duke’s clemency. The 
Duke, who proves to be the only semi-compassionate one of the lot, 
spares Shylock’s life and the portion of his estate that would otherwise 
go to Venice. Antonio, on the other hand, is not so kind. When asked by 
Portia  “[w]hat  mercy  can  you  render  him[…]?”60 he spitefully requests 
that Shylock be converted to Christianity and that he hold the other 
half of the Shylock’s estate “in use” for the Jew’s reviled daughter and 
her Christian husband.61 The drafting of a deed of use clearly raises 
equitable considerations, as the common law penalty clause is trumped 
and substituted in favour of an equitable construct. In a way, Shylock’s 
trial   mirrors   the   conflict   of   laws   present   in   Shakespeare’s   England,  
and the trial’s questionable resolution casts grave doubt over the 
administration of justice in such a system. While the court’s drafting of 
a deed of use may be viewed as the triumph of equity over the perverse 
application of the common law, any reader who realizes this malicious 
pretense of justice will have a healthy skepticism. Equity rightly defeats 
the penalty in Shylock’s bond, but it is improperly carried to unjust ends 
59   Several  theorists,  such  as  Zuckert  and  Bernthal,  have  maintained  that  Portia  
represents New Testament mercy while Shylock stands for Old Testament “justice” 
(i.e.  an  eye  for  an  eye;;  revenge).  However,  when  one  considers  the  undeniably  
punitive aspect of Portia’s judgment, this renders the biblical assessment untenable. 
Renowned  Shakespearean  scholar  Harold  Bloom  likewise  dismisses  this  notion  in  
Shakespeare and the Invention of the Human  (New  York:  Riverhead  Books,  1998).  
While it is unclear why Portia  persecutes  Shylock  in  the  manner  that  she  does  (anti-­
Semitic indicators aside), it appears that she returns the very vengeance the Jew 
sought against Antonio. This stands in opposition to the laws of Christian morality, 
which informed the Renaissance conception of natural law.  
60    Shakespeare, supra note 2 at IV.i ln. 376.
61  Presumably, Antonio requests Shylock’s conversion not only to punish the Jew, 
but also to redeem his Jewish soul. However, as the Christians in the play do not 
come off any better than the evil Shylock, this may realistically be viewed as a lateral 
move at best.
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which offend conscience, morality, and Natural Law. The Christians 
do not season justice with mercy, but rather poison it with hypocrisy, 
vengeance, and hatred. In the end, the Duke vows to recant his pardon 
should the judgment be refused, and a dejected and castigated Shylock 
leaves the court. 
III. NATURAL JUSTICE AND ITS ABUSES
Beyond  the  Christians’  cruel  abuse  of  Shylock,  a  close  reading  of  The 
Merchant of Venice reveals further violations of Natural Law. In particular, 
the trial scene presents gross violations of a procedural derivative of 
Natural Law known as natural justice. There are two branches of natural 
justice   that   relate   to   the  concept  of  procedural   fairness:  audi alteram 
partem (the  right  to  be  heard)  and  nemo  judex  in  parte  sua  (no  person  
may judge his or her own cause). The second principle, nemo   judex, 
further requires that the decision maker be unbiased and independent, 
and   this   is   of   particular   significance   to   the   trial   in  The Merchant of 
Venice. Considering the trial in its procedural totality, one can hardly 
conclude that Shylock has received a fair hearing. 
A   significant   procedural   concern   is   raised   by   the   role   of   Portia  
at trial. Portia assumes an assortment of roles, functioning as the 
disinterested amicus curiae,62 passionate party advocate, and judge 
(as  the  characters  constantly  refer  to  her).  This  dilemma  is  not  easily  
resolved. Portia begins the scene setting out the law and Shylock’s 
right to the penalty, continues to preach in favour of mercy, and 
when Shylock refuses to relent she manipulates the law in Antonio’s 
favour to defeat the bond and to punish the Jew. What began as a 
civil hearing to resolve the enforcement of a private bond transforms 
into a criminal trial, whereby Shylock is tried as an alien and found 
guilty before the court. While this multiplicity of roles and the 
dramatic turn in the trial were obviously literary imperatives, there is 
no question that Shylock’s right to procedural fairness is violated. 
In the same vein, Portia’s involvement in the trial renders it 
impossible to regard her as an impartial decision maker. To use a 
legal term, there is a “reasonable apprehension of bias” raised by her 
participation. Portia arrives at court disguised as a doctor of laws in 
62   Expert  legal  advisor  to  the  Duke.  Both  Ziolkowski,  supra note 31 and White, 
supra note 4, make this observation.
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the place—and upon the recommendation—of the famous lawyer 
Bellario.  The  nature  of   that  written   reference   is  not   entirely  clear  
to the audience, for Portia is either lying as to her recommendation 
(that   is,  Bellario’s   letter   is   a   forgery),   or  Bellario  wrote   the   letter  
but lied as to Portia’s identity. In either case, the audience is aware 
that Portia is defrauding the court. In doing so, Portia transplants 
herself into an adjudicative role, and one that becomes increasingly 
problematic  when  one  considers  her  relation  to  Bellario,  a  principal  
in the action, and Antonio, a party to the bond. Throughout the trial 
she condescendingly refers to Shylock as “Jew,” while Antonio 
is called by his proper name, which gives further evidence of an 
obvious  bias  on  her  part   (and,   likewise,  of   the  social   tenor  of   the  
day). In the end, Shylock is not only subject to an unnatural Law of 
the Alien Statute, but an unnatural process. Natural Law is abused 
on nearly every conceivable level, and this brings the entire Venetian 
(and  by  extension,  English)  justice  system  into  disrepute.      
CONCLUSION
Shakespeare’s portrayal of the trial scene in The Merchant of Venice 
reveals that “Natural Law [is] just as theatrically interesting as observ-
ance of it.”63 The dramatization of the struggle between positivism and 
Natural Law also demonstrates that it is an exceptionally complex issue, 
the play suffering a decidedly unresolved resolution. While Shylock 
represents a depraved adherence to formalism, his defeat provides the 
audience with no consolation as Portia abuses Natural Law to her own 
ends through substantive and procedural means. Ultimately, the spirit of 
the law proves no more righteous than the letter, and the audience is re-
quired to make a critical moral judgment on the nature and administra-
tion  of  justice:  that  both  letter  and  spirit  are  corruptible.  While  the  play  
may be “altogether without morals,”64 it is imperative that the audience 
still possesses them. 
63  White, supra note 4 at 5.
64  Windolph, supra note 1 at 46. 
